Connect with us

Finance

Chinese economy weakening shakes faith in CCP leadership

Published

on


China Acrobats Chinese balancing
Performers
from the Kunming Acrobatic Circus of China rehearse prior to the
troupe’s premiere in Bogota, Colombia, Friday, Sept. 14,
2012.

AP

  • China’s leaders have spent years convincing the world
    that they’re ready to handle a slower growing, more volatile
    economy.
  • But President Donald Trump’s trade war against the
    country is adding an unexpected, so-far uncontrollable level of
    difficulty for policymakers and uncertainty to the global
    financial community.
  • That may set China’s economy up for the worst kind of
    crisis it could ever face — a crisis of faith.

With every day that passes it seems more likely the US and China
will not be able to avert a full-scale trade war.

On the US side, President Donald Trump recently announced his
willingness to put tariffs on all of China’s exports to the
United States by January. Meanwhile, in Beijing,
The South China Morning Post reports
that think tanks are
struggling to have honest conversations with legislators about
how to proceed with trade negotiations, afraid that criticism of
the Chinese economic model or the government’s handling of trade
talks thus far may get them in trouble.

Frank communication, as things stand now, seem to be in short
supply all around. One day, Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Trump seem to be hashing it out; the next, the market is sliding
again.

This year was already turning into a difficult one for Chinese
economic policymakers. After a steady start to 2018 the country’s
economy started slowing dramatically in the second half of the
year — a long expected result of China’s financial-system reform,
an attempt to ween itself off of the debt gorge that kept its
economy growing through the Great Financial Crisis.

Analysts expected that particular kind of hiccup. Beijing has
been preparing the world for a more volatile, slower growing
Chinese economy for years now, and by and large they’ve convinced
the world that they can handle that.

What they did not expect, however, was how the added pressure of
a trade war — the drama of continued failed negotiations — would
exacerbate the situation.

“For China, signs of a further slide in growth and threats
of expanded tariffs from the U.S. are an unfortunate
combination,” noted Bloomberg chief economist Tom Orlik. “So far,
Beijing has managed to find policies that combine targeted
stimulus with steps toward reform. If demand continues to
deteriorate, threading that needle will get harder to do.”

Now China’s currency, the yuan, is falling to its lowest level
against the dollar in a decade, and Beijing is pledging to fight
to keep it afloat. China’s property market, the engine of
its economy, is flailing as housing sales fell 3.6% in September,
and property investment — half of the country’s overall
investment — is likely to follow. The stock market is crashing —
the Shanghai Composite is down over 21% year to date — and
warning signs in sectors like automobiles
and manufacturing
are flashing.

This is a test for the brains behind China’s economy. Not since
the late 1990s/early 2000s has it been this weak in the face of a
potential disaster. How policymakers handle this could change the
way the entire global financial community thinks about their
ability to deal with crisis.

This could turn into a crisis of faith, challenging the most
important idea holding China’s economy together — I call it, the
“they’ve got this,” theory of Chinese economics.


Xi Jinping
Chinese
President Xi Jinping speaks during the during 2018 Beijing Summit
Of The Forum On China-Africa Cooperation – Joint Press Conference
at the Great Hall of the People at The Great Hall Of The People
on September 4, 2018 in Beijing, China.

Lintao Zhang/Pool/Getty Images

Chill, they’ve got this

The “they’ve got this” theory of Chinese economics goes like
this: While democratic capitalism is nice, authoritarian state
planning has its benefits — and one of those benefits is that the
smartest people with all the answers are running China’s economy.
They get to guide it as they please, and so far they have had the
correct policy mix in place to avert all of the little disasters
that have emanated from the economy since things started getting
really hairy in 2015.

And so in the event that something major happens don’t worry
y’all, “they’ve got this.” 

You hear this thesis in academic circles and at hedge fund
conferences and among the thinkers at certain think tanks. Even
famed investor Ray Dalio, founder of the world’s largest hedge
fund Bridgewater Associates, is a proponent of this notion. While
in China last February, he preferred to avoid direct questions
about the economy,
according to The Wall Street Journal
, saying only that he was
“very bullish” on China and that the issue wasn’t the challenges
but the way they were handled.

And Beijing has the best handlers in the business, so the
theory goes.

On the other hand — and this post is very much about the
other hand — what if they don’t? This “they’ve got this” type
thinking, after all, was the reasoning behind why the USSR was
such an economic success until it very much wasn’t. So it may be
for China.

Now that an incredibly disruptive trade war has been thrown
into the mix with an already complicated reform agenda, the
prospect that Chinese policymakers lose the “they’ve got this”
benefit of the doubt is very much in play.

Over at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
authors 
Logan Wright and Daniel Rosen examined the
slow creation (and potential destruction) of China’s “they’ve got
this” narrative in a paper called “Credit and Credibility; Risks
to China’s Resilience.”

They explain it like this:

“…traditional explanations of China’s financial
stability underestimate the vital importance of Beijing’s
credibility in providing a sufficient government response to
any financial stress. Credibility has been a powerful
political asset reinforcing financial stability, but it is
not intrinsic to China’s system.

Credibility is a byproduct of a track record of
successful and meaningful interventions defending investors’
interests, and this same credibility will be tested as China
reforms its financial system and steps back from widespread
implicit and explicit guarantees on assets, companies, and
banks…

Credibility has helped Beijing to manage the typical
consequences of rapid credit expansions, but this credibility
is transient and will be taxed in the near future as
financial reform proceeds.”

Stop, you’re doing too much

Now enter the trade war.

Current, unexpected, circumstances are pushing policymakers to
return to what got them in this situation and hurts their
credibility — loosening credit conditions.

On the one hand,
Chinese news outlets
are reassuring investors that the
economy is still on the path to reform and that they’re going
to stick to their guns despite what looks like a dreadful
situation.

On the other hand, there are signs that policy could be moving
in the opposite direction. In a note to clients earlier
this month, analysts at Societe Generale acknowledged that the
country experienced a surge in local government bonds in August
and September. Earlier this week
 the People’s Bank
of China released more
guidance on boosting infrastructure investment
. Around the
same time, The China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission asked banks to
boost their lending of unsecured or uncolateralized loans

to private enterprises.

Now to be fair, private enterprises in China are not in
the same debt trouble as its massive state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). And policymakers are saying that the stimulus efforts
they’ve made so far (like a recent tax cut) are targeted at
private enterprises and households. Therefore, they’re not a
return to old habits, and they’re not going to fortify “zombie”
companies — profitless SOEs that need credit to survive.

China takes a “whole of society” view of national
interest in all capacities, and has shown a commitment to
marshaling any and all of the resources in its economy in the
face of this debt crisis. For example, the government has
urged healthy
private companies to take ownership stakes in struggling
SOEs
 in the past. 

Either way, recent data from private surveyor China Beige
Book contradicts the government line that only private
enterprises are getting credit help.

“…corporate borrowing isn’t sliding — it exploded in Q3 to
the highest level we’ve seen since 2013,” the company said in
its latest quarterly report.

“A rise in borrowing by small and medium-sized enterprises
could have been expected, with the PBOC urging as much
seemingly every week. But this quarter everyone borrowed more.
Large firms saw borrowing rocket skyward. By sector,
manufacturers borrowed at a frenzied pace, while property firms
borrowed at a 5-year high.”

Perhaps this is why in a recent note, analysts at Societe
Generale noted a “puzzling strength in manufacturing
investment” despite the fact that manufacturing output slowed
from 6.7% in 2Q to 6.0% in 3Q and continues to be in a
downtrend. It also seemed strange to them that real estate
investment was still resilient despite declining property
values.

“They said deleveraging was irreversible but they’ve
already reversed it,” China Beige Book founder Leland Miller
told Business Insider over the phone.

“They’re back to their old formula… it’s not 2009, 2010
but it’s remarkable to hear the narrative — which is that
conditions are tight and corporates can’t get credit. They’re
investing a lot more than what people say. Official data is
more negative than what we saw in China Beige Book Q3.”


China economic charts GDP, production growth of high value industriesSociete Generale

A downturn, with Chinese characteristics

Obviously, whatever the government is doing hasn’t been enough
to beat back China’s economic slump, suggesting that
introducing new credit to the economy is becoming a less and
less effective jolt as debt builds up.

But what else is there to do? A lot could go wrong before the
US and China come to any sort of agreement at Xi and Trump’s
meeting at the G20 at the end of this month.

For example, China’s September export numbers looked good, in
part, because exporters were front loading orders to the US
ahead of more trade war action. That is to say we haven’t even
seen the full impact of Trump’s trade war measure in the data
yet.

Meanwhile, we’re seeing personal consumption — something
Chinese authorities have been trying so hard to build up in
order to modernize the economy — take a hit already.

From Societe Generale:

“…the 3Q data suggest that domestic demand – primarily
consumer demand – became less supportive of growth over the
quarter, more than offsetting the improvement in net
trade.

The year-to-date contribution from consumption (including
both households and government) to headline GDP growth slipped
from 5.34pp to 5.23pp, while the input from net trade inched up
from -0.67pp to -0.66pp.” 

This is especially disconcerting data for China this week. On
Monday, Xi kicked off a six-day expo in Shanghai meant to
showcase the country as a buyer of international goods.
Unfortunately, according to the
New York Times
, the event was poorly attended. Big trading
countries like Germany, Japan, and the US didn’t show. One
attendee, the President of Kenya, complained that his country’s
trading relationship with Beijing was “heavily skewed in
favor of China.”

Now, more than ever, China needs friends —even more
specifically, friends who still believe “they’ve got
this.”

Continue Reading
Advertisement Find your dream job

Trending